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NOTES
DELAWARE TO THE RESCUE: A PROPER
EXERCISE OF DEFERENCE BY THE SEC AND
THE FUTURE IMPLICATIONS OF CA, INC. V.
AFSCME
I. INTRODUCTION
Ever since the emergence of the modern corporation, some
shareholders, known as shareholder activists, have tried to gather more
power in the day-to-day management of the firm. 1 Typically, the
corporation is managed by a group known as the board of directors, with
minimal interference from shareholders. 2 However, the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) allows shareholders a chance to influence the
corporation via shareholder proposals, which are proposals made by
shareholders that are “placed alongside management’s proposals in that
company’s proxy [voting] materials for presentation to a vote at an annual
or special meeting.” 3 Nevertheless, upon the request of the corporation
receiving the proposal, the SEC may exclude such a proposal if it violates
“certain procedural requirements or the proposal falls within one of the
Rule 14a-8’s [thirteen] substantive grounds for exclusion.” 4
Usually, the SEC decides whether the proposal violates any of the
provisions without help from any outside source. 5 However, that all
changed in July 2008 when the SEC certified a request for exclusion made
by a corporation to the Delaware Supreme Court pursuant to a new power
the court was granted by the Delaware legislature. 6 The case, CA, Inc. v.
American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees Pension
Plan (AFSCME), was accepted for adjudication by the Delaware Supreme

1. MELVIN A. EISENBERG, CORPORATION AND OTHER BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS 154–55
(9th ed. 2005) (stating that in 1932, Adolph A. Berle and Gardiner C. Means gave rise to the
modern corporation when their influential paper, The Modern Corporation and Private Property,
argued that ownership and control in a corporation should be separate from one another. The work
is widely adopted today).
2. Id. at 106.
3. Id. at 304–05 (quoting SEC Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14A (2002)). Details about how
shareholder proposals work, and the company’s ability to exclude them under Rule 14a-8 of the
federal proxy rules, are discussed in Part II.
4. Paul S. Atkins, Commissioner, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Address at the U.S. Chamber
of Commerce: Shareholder Rights, the 2008 Proxy Season, and the Impact of Shareholder
Activism (July 22, 2008).
5. Id.
6. The ability for the SEC to certify to the Delaware Supreme Court is codified in Del. Const.
art. IV, § 11(8). The author worked at the SEC, in the Chief Counsel’s office for the Division of
Corporation Finance, during the period in which the questions of law presented in the CA, Inc. noaction request were certified and decided by the Delaware Supreme Court.
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Court and decided two weeks later in a landmark opinion. 7 Relying on the
court’s opinion, the SEC excluded the proposal and thus, for the first time
in its history, decided an issue that arose under the federal proxy rules by
directly relying on the decision of a state court. 8
The court’s decision in CA, Inc. has raised eyebrows for two reasons.
First, federalism questions have emerged regarding the SEC’s ability to
certify questions of law to outside jurisdictions in order to help it make
decisions under federal securities laws. Second, the court’s decision is
important because it affects Delaware law. Since CA, Inc. was a Delaware
decision, the case is likely to influence the corporate law jurisprudence of
other states. 9 CA, Inc. will also affect a majority of publicly traded
corporations since Delaware is their choice for incorporation. 10 Thus, this
note will have a dual purpose: (1) to analyze the federalism aspects of the
SEC’s decision to certify two questions of law to the Delaware Supreme
Court and (2) to determine what impact the CA, Inc. case will have on
Delaware’s (and presumably other states’) corporate law jurisprudence as it
relates to the ability of shareholders to affect a corporation via the bylaw
amendment process. Part II of this note describes the SEC’s role under Rule
14a-8 of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act (‘34 Act). 11 Part III describes
the power of the SEC to certify questions of law to the Delaware Supreme
Court. Part IV of this note explores the facts and background of the CA, Inc.
case including the actual shareholder proposal submitted by AFSCME,
briefly discusses the decision and rationale of the Delaware Supreme Court
and introduces what the case stood for, both from a federalism perspective
and for Delaware Corporation Law. Part V focuses on why the SEC was
criticized for certifying this federal proxy rule case to the Delaware
Supreme Court, and responds to the criticisms specifically advanced by
Professor J. Robert Brown, a corporate law scholar. 12 The section concludes
with this author’s defense of the SEC’s actions, and a suggestion for how
all states can improve their corporate law. Part VI of this note discusses the
affects of the CA, Inc. case on Delaware corporate law and reviews the
reactions of scholars and commentators to the decision. In addition, it
7. See CA, Inc. v. Am. Fed’n of State, County & Mun. Employees Pension Plan, 953 A.2d
227 (Del. 2008). The opinion and its future implications are discussed infra in Part VI.
8. See CA, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2008 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 516 at *1, discussed infra
in Part IV.
9. See
Delaware
Supreme
Court
to
SEC:
Bring
It
On,
http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2007/05/21/delaware-supreme-court-to-sec-bring-it-on/ (May 21, 2007,
15:32 EST) (stating that the Delaware Supreme Court is influential).
10. More than 50% of all publicly-traded companies in the United States, including 63% of the
Fortune 500, have chosen Delaware as their legal home. Delaware Dept. of St.: Div. of Corp.,
http://www.corp.delaware.gov/aboutagency.shtml (last visited Mar. 1, 2009).
11. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2008).
12. Professor Brown is a Corporate Governance and Business Law Professor at the University
of
Denver,
Sturm
College
of
Law.
See
Professor
Jay
Brown,
http://law.du.edu/index.php/profile/jay-brown.
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explains why the case is a significant loss for shareholders outside of
election related bylaw amendments.
II. RULE 14A-8 OF THE EXCHANGE ACT
The ‘34 Act was created because “transactions in securities as
commonly conducted upon securities exchanges and over-the-counter
markets [involve a] national public interest . . . [making it necessary to]
provide for regulation and control of such transactions and of practices and
matters related thereto . . . to insure the maintenance of fair and honest
markets in such transactions.” 13 Rule 14a-8 of the ‘34 Act allows for
shareholders who meet certain guidelines to submit proposals to companies
in which they hold shares. 14 However, Rule 14a-8 also allows companies to
exclude such proposals under various grounds. 15 Thus, if a shareholder
submits a proposal to a company, the company is allowed to exclude the
proposal from its annual meeting if it believes the ‘34 Act allows for it.
However, in order to exclude the proposal, the company must file a “noaction” request with the SEC’s Division of Corporation Finance 16 (Staff),
asking them to “concur in the company’s view” that the proposal is
excludable under Rule 14a-8 of the ‘34 Act. 17 Although the Staff’s decision
is not binding, 18 companies rarely, if ever, go against what the Staff says for
fear of enforcement action against them by the SEC. 19
13. 15 U.S.C. § 78(b) (2006). Other goals of the ‘34 Act were to govern “transactions by
officers, directors, and principal security holders, to require appropriate reports to remove
impediments to and perfect the mechanisms of a national market system for securities and a
national system for the clearance and settlement of securities transactions and the safeguarding of
securities and funds related thereto, and to impose requirements necessary to make such regulation
and control reasonably complete and effective, in order to protect interstate commerce, the
national credit, the [f]ederal taxing power, to protect and make more effective the national
banking system and Federal Reserve System.” 15 U.S.C. § 78(b).
14. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(b) (2008) (“[I]n order to be eligible to submit a proposal,
[shareholders] must have continuously held at least $2,000 in market value, or 1%, of the
company’s securities entitled to be voted on the proposal at the meeting for at least one year by
the date you submit the proposal. [Shareholders] must continue to hold those securities through
the date of the meeting.”).
15. There are two types of exclusions that a company can use in order to invalidate a
shareholder proposal: procedural and substantive. Procedural exclusions are located in 17 C.F.R. §
240.14a-8(b)-(e). Substantive exclusions are located in 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)(1)–(i)(13).
16. The Division of Corporation Finance of the SEC has the power to interpret and decide
questions under Rule 14a-8. See SEC.gov, No-Action Letters, http://sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/cfnoaction/14a-8.shtml (last visited Apr. 13, 2009).
17. SEC
Staff
Legal
Bulletin
No.
14
(2001),
available
at
http://sec.gov/interps/legal/cfslb14.htm.
18. See id. (“[T]he no-action responses only reflect our [the Staff’s] informal views regarding
the application of Rule 14a-8. We do not claim to issue ‘rulings’ or ‘decisions’ on proposals that
companies indicate they intend to exclude, and our determinations do not and cannot adjudicate
the merits of a company’s position with respect to a proposal”).
19. See Cooley Godward Kronish LLP, CooleyAlert! Shareholder Proposals: What You Need
to Know Now, 1, 1 (2004), http://www.cooley.com/files/tbl_s24News/PDFUpload152/780/
ALERT_Shareholder_Proposal.pdf (stating that “the company may not exclude the proposal
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Under Rules 14a-8(i)(1) and (i)(2), the SEC has the power to grant noaction relief to a company if the shareholder’s proposal is “not a proper
subject for action by shareholders under the laws of the jurisdiction of the
company’s organization” 20 or, “if implemented, [would] cause the company
to violate any state, federal, or foreign law to which it is subject.” 21
Essentially, Rules 14a-8(i)(1) and (i)(2) ask the SEC to interpret the law of
the company’s state of incorporation and decide whether the state’s
corporate law would allow for the exclusion of such proposal. 22
Traditionally, the SEC’s role under Rules 14a-8(i)(1) and (i)(2) was similar
to that of a federal court applying state law in a diversity jurisdiction case,
with one key difference: the lack of power to certify questions of law to the
relevant state court for interpretation and decision. 23
III. THE SEC’S CERTIFICATION ABILITY
In 2007, the SEC received the power to certify questions of law to a
state court when Delaware, wanting the SEC to “advance a direct
interpretation of Delaware law,” 24 amended its state constitution to allow
the SEC to certify questions of law directly to the Delaware Supreme
Court. 25 The Delaware certification provision allows the SEC to ask the
Delaware Supreme Court any questions about Delaware state law. This is
helpful for the SEC in situations where its decision requires an application
of Delaware state law. While some hailed the move as potentially “the most

unless it has received a response from the SEC indicating that it will not take any enforcement
action against the company if the shareholder proposal is omitted.”). However, it should be noted
that all parties to a no-action request have the ability to appeal the Staff’s decision to the Federal
District Court.
20. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)(1) (2008).
21. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)(2).
22. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)(1) & (i)(2).
23. In a case brought on diversity jurisdiction grounds, federal courts generally apply the law
the state court in the state of the diversity filing would have applied. See generally Erie Railroad
Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). This is similar to the SEC which applies the law of the state
in which the company is incorporated (i.e. if the company is incorporated in New York, then the
SEC will apply the corporate law the New York state courts would have applied). However,
unlike the SEC in non-Delaware cases, federal judges may go “straight to those responsible for
declaring state law [and] certify novel questions of state law directly to the state’s highest court.”
Wendy L. Watson, Mckinzie Craig & Daniel Orion Davis, Federal Court Certification of StateLaw Questions: Active Judicial Federalism, JUST. SYS. J. 1, 1 (2007), available at
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa4043/is_200701/ai_n18755748?tag=untagged.
24. Delaware Supreme Court to SEC: Bring It On, supra note 9.
25. DEL. CONST. art. IV, § 11(8) (“The Supreme Court shall have jurisdiction . . . [t]o hear and
determine questions of law certified to it by . . . the United States Securities and Exchange
Commission.”).
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important development in Delaware corporate law,” 26 others were far less
enthused about the possibility of federal deference to a state court. 27
Following the constitutional amendment, AFSCME introduced a
proposal 28 to CA, Inc. (CA) for inclusion in its 2008 Annual Meeting of
Shareholders. 29 CA, pursuant to Rules 14a-8(i)(1), (i)(2), (i)(3), 30 and
(i)(8), 31 asked the Staff to concur in their judgment that the proposal was
excludable. 32 While the Staff refused to exclude the proposal under (i)(3)
and (i)(8), 33 it was unsure whether CA met its burden under (i)(1) and (i)(2)
to exclude AFSCME’s proposal. 34 Since CA was a company incorporated
in Delaware, 35 the SEC decided to certify two questions of law concerning
CA’s no-action request to the Delaware Supreme Court using the new
power granted to it approximately one-year prior. 36 The Delaware Supreme
Court accepted certification 37 and decided the case in sixteen days, 38
ultimately concluding that the proposal was illegal under Delaware state
law. 39 Consequently, “having the guidance of the Delaware decision, the
SEC staff notified CA on July 17, 2008, that the proposal could be excluded
on the basis of Rule 14a-8(i)(2).” 40
Immediately following the case, the SEC was attacked by scholars who
believed it was improper for the SEC to decide a federal issue by exercising

26. SEC to Certify Questions to Delaware Supreme, http://www.theconglomerate.org/2007/05/
sec_to_certify_.html/ (May 22, 2007).
27. As Predicted: The SEC and the Further Denial of Shareholder Access,
http://www.theracetothebottom.org/the-sec-governance/as-predicted-the-sec-and-the-furtherdenial-of-shareholder-a.html (July 1, 2008, 13:00) (calling the SEC’s certification ability “a very
bad idea for so many reasons.”).
28. See CA, Inc., v. Am. Fed’n of State, County & Mun. Employees Pension Plan, 953 A.2d
227, 227 (Del. 2008).
29. CA, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2008 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 495 at *1.
30. Rule 14a-8(i)(3) allows for proposal exclusion if the “proposal or supporting statement is
contrary to any of the Commission’s proxy rules, including § 240.14a-9, which prohibits
materially false or misleading statements in proxy soliciting materials.” 17 C.F.R. 240.14a-8(i)(3)
(2008).
31. Rule 14a-8(i)(8) allows for proposal exclusion if the “proposal relates to a nomination or
an election for membership on the company’s board of directors or analogous governing body or a
procedure for such nomination or election.” 17 C.F.R. 240.14a-8(i)(8).
32. Request of CA, Inc, 2008 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 495, at *49.
33. Id. at *1.
34. Id. at *2.
35. This information is available via the SEC IDEA database, http://sec.gov/cgi-bin/browseedgar?company= &CIK= CA&filenum=&State=&SIC=&owner=include&action=getcompany.
36. 2008 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 495, at *2.
37. Order accepting certification from the SEC, CA, Inc., v. Am. Fed’n of State, County &
Mun. Employees Pension Plan, No. 329, 2008 1, 3 (Del. 2008), available at
http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/files/2008/07/corrected-order.pdf.
38. The Delaware Supreme Court accepted certification on July 1, 2008. Id. The case was
decided on July 17, 2008. See CA, Inc., v. Am. Fed’n of State, County & Mun. Employees
Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227, 227 (Del. 2008).
39. CA, Inc., 953 A.2d at 227.
40. Atkins, supra note 4.
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deference to a state court. 41 However, CA, Inc. should not be looked at
solely through the prism of federalism philosophy and debate. The actual
substantive decision of the case is one that has inspired passionate
arguments from numerous scholars, commentators, law firms and experts
on the topic, many who disagree as to what exactly the Delaware Supreme
Court decided. Were all election bylaws therefore good, so long as they
contained an express fiduciary out clause? 42 Could shareholders affect a
corporation via bylaws for other types of corporate governance issues? 43
The CA, Inc. decision left these questions open to interpretation.
IV. FACTS AND BACKGROUND OF CA, INC. V. AFSCME
On April 18, 2008, CA submitted six copies of its no-action request 44
asking the Staff to exclude a proposal presented to it by AFSCME. The
relevant part of the proposal reads as follows:
The board of directors shall cause the corporation to reimburse a
stockholder or group of stockholders (together, the “Nominator”) for
reasonable expenses (“Expenses”) incurred in connection with nominating
one or more candidates in a contested election of directors to the
corporation’s board of directors, including, without limitation, printing,
mailing, legal, solicitation, travel, advertising and public relations
expenses, so long as (a) the election of fewer than 50% of the directors to
be elected is contested in the election, (b) one or more candidates
nominated by the Nominator are elected to the corporation’s board of
directors, (c) stockholders are not permitted to cumulate their votes for
41. As Predicted: The SEC and the Further Denial of Shareholder Access, supra note 27
(calling the SEC’s certification ability “a bad idea for so many reasons”).
42. Professor Brown argues that the case has “dramatically broaden[ed] the types of bylaws
that now must be excluded under Rule 14a-8.” As Predicted: The SEC and the Further Denial of
Shareholder Access (The Anticipated Result) (Part 18), http://www.theracetothebottom.org/thesec-governance/as-predicted-the-sec-and-the-further-denial-of-shareholder-a-71468.html (July 18,
2008 06:14). Another blogger maintains that the case is a “huge win” for shareholders inside the
election process, but “negative for all other types of stockholder-adopted bylaws.” CA v.
AFSCME: The Delaware Supreme Court Giveth and the Supreme Court Taketh Away,
http://www.deallawyers.com/blog/archives/2008_07.html (July 18, 2008 07:29 EST). However,
Larry Ribstein argues “the court made it clear that it was not deciding the issue as a matter of
policy, and left insurgents alternative procedures. Thus, the court was careful to present itself as a
pragmatic forum that would hear the shareholders out on a case by case basis.” Delaware
Responds to the Certified Questions, http://busmovie.typepad.com/ideoblog/2008/07/delawarerespon.html (July 17, 2008 20:19 EST) [hereinafter, Ribstein, Delaware Responds]. See also Barry
H. Genkin & Keith E. Gottfried, Delaware Supreme Court Holds That A Bylaw Mandating
Reimbursement Of A Dissident Shareholder’s Proxy Solicitation Expenses Is A Proper Subject
For Unilateral Shareholder Action But As Proposed Violates Delaware Law, Aug. 28, 2008,
available at http://www.blankrome.com/index.cfm?contentID=37&itemID=1655 (“[W]hile [the]
decision can be seen as a significant victory for dissident and activist shareholders, it leaves many
questions unanswered.”).
43. See sources cited supra note 42.
44. When a company requests that the Staff concur in its judgment that it may exclude the
proposal under Rule 14a-8, it must submit six copies of its response pursuant to 17 C.F.R. § 14a8(j)(2) (2008).

2009]

Delaware to the Rescue

437

directors, and (d) the election occurred, and the Expenses were incurred,
after [the] bylaw’s adoption. The amount paid to a Nominator under this
bylaw in respect of a contested election shall not exceed the amount
expended by the corporation in connection with such election. 45

CA asked the Staff to concur in its judgment that the proposal violated
Rules 14a-8(i)(1), (i)(2), (i)(3) and (i)(8). 46 Furthermore, CA furnished a
legal opinion 47 from the law firm Richards, Layton and Finger (RLF),
stating the proposal, “if adopted, would cause [CA] to violate [s]ection
141(a) of the [Delaware] General Corporation Law (DGCL).” 48 Section
141(a) of the DGCL requires that the corporation be managed by the board
of directors, subject to limitations and grants of power stated in the
certificate of incorporation. 49 Since CA’s Certificate of Incorporation
clearly stated that the management and conduct of the business “shall be
vested in its Board of Directors,” RLF asserted the “Certificate of
Incorporation does not contemplate management by the stockholders or
anyone other than the Board of Directors of the Company.” 50 Thus, RLF
concluded that AFSCME’s proposal could not be legal under the DGCL
because the “[p]roposed [b]ylaw would require that the Board relinquish its
power to determine what expenses should and should not be reimbursed to
stockholders, instead requiring that the Board reimburse all proxy
solicitation expenses that meet the criteria set forth in the [p]roposed
[b]ylaw.” 51
On May 21, 2008, AFSCME responded to CA’s no-action request by
submitting a legal opinion of its own to the Staff, explaining why it felt that
the proposal submitted to CA was legal under the DGCL. 52 In support of
AFSCME’s position, its counsel, Grant & Eisenhofer (G&E), asserted that
the proposal was legal under the DGCL because “shareholders have the
power to enact bylaws.” 53 Furthermore, G&E argued that language in
section 109(b) of the DGCL strengthened this argument. 54 Section 109(b) of
the DGCL states that “bylaws may contain any provision, not inconsistent
with law or with the certificate of incorporation, relating to the business of
45. CA, Inc., v. Am. Fed’n of State, County & Mun. Employees Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227,
227 (Del. 2008).
46. Request of CA, Inc., CA, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2008 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 495, at
*49.
47. Whenever a company tries to exclude a proposal “based on matters of state or foreign law”
(i.e., under (i)(1) or (i)(2)), “a supporting opinion of counsel” is required. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a8(j)(2)(iii).
48. Request of CA, Inc., 2008 SEC No-Act LEXIS 495, at *60.
49. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 141(a) (2008).
50. Request of CA, Inc., 2008 SEC No-Act LEXIS 495, at *76 (quoting art. SEVENTH, § 1 of
CA, Inc. Certificate of Incorporation).
51. Id. at *78.
52. See generally Response of AFSCME, 2008 SEC No-Act LEXIS 495.
53. Id. at *23.
54. Id. at *23–24.
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the corporation, the conduct of its affairs, and its rights or powers or the
rights or powers of its stockholders, directors, officers or employees.” 55
Therefore, G&E concluded AFSCME’s bylaw was valid since Delaware
law would allow for “a Corporation to expend corporate funds to reimburse
successful nominators.” 56
After CA provided an answer to AFSCME’s response that reiterated its
initial arguments, the Staff issued its initial no-action response to the parties
involved. 57 Writing for the Staff, Thomas J. Kim 58 concluded that the SEC
would have to certify questions of law to Delaware to decide the no-action
request, to determine if the “proposal is a proper subject for action by
shareholders as a matter of Delaware law, and . . . whether the proposal, if
adopted, would cause CA to violate any Delaware law to which it is
subject.” 59 Thus, the SEC was going to defer to a state court in order to
answer a no-action request for the first time ever, via the power granted to it
by Delaware in 2005. 60 By asking whether the “proposal is a proper action
for shareholders,” the SEC was looking for an answer to Rule 14a-8(i)(1). 61
In addition, in asking “whether the proposal, if adopted, would cause CA to
violate any Delaware Law,” the SEC was looking for an answer to Rule
14a-8(i)(2). 62 Concluding that “important and urgent reasons” existed for an
“immediate determination of the questions certified,” the Delaware
Supreme Court accepted the certified questions on July 1, 2008. 63
On July 16, 2008, after briefs were submitted and oral arguments
conducted, 64 Justice Jack B. Jacobs, writing for the court en banc, 65
answered both questions in the affirmative. 66 According to the court, the
proposal was a proper action because corporate expenditures do not
override the basic, fundamental right of shareholders to “facilitate the
[ability to participate in selecting contestants to the Board of Directors] by
proposing a bylaw that would encourage candidates other than
[management’s] nominees to stand for election. [AFSCME’s proposal]
55.
56.
57.
58.

DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 109(b) (2008).
Response of AFSCME, SEC No-Action Letter, 2008 SEC No-Act LEXIS 495, at *26.
See 2008 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 495.
Thomas J. Kim is the Chief Counsel & Associate Director for the Division of Corporate
Finance. Id. at *2.
59. Id.
60. Id. at *1.
61. This is what the language of Rule 14a-8(i)(1) mandates. See 17 C.F.R. 240.14a-8(i)(1)
(2008).
62. This is what the language of Rule 14a-8(i)(2) mandates. See 17 C.F.R. 240.14a-8(i)(2).
63. Order accepting certification from the SEC, CA, Inc., v. Am. Fed’n of State, County &
Mun. Employees Pension Plan, No. 329, 2008 1, 3 (Del. 2008), available at
http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/files/2008/07/corrected-order.pdf.
64. Briefs were submitted on July 7, 2008. Oral arguments were held on July 9, 2008. Id.
65. Typically, the Delaware Supreme Court sits in panels of three Justices. Del. Sup. Ct. R.
4(c).
66. CA, Inc., v. Am. Fed’n of State, County & Mun. Employees Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227,
237, 240 (Del. 2008).
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accomplish[es] [this] by committing the corporation to reimburse the
election expenses of shareholders whose candidates are successfully
elected.” 67
Nevertheless, the court went on to conclude that AFSCME’s bylaw
provision was illegal because, when looking at the proposal abstractly, 68
AFSCME’s proposal “would violate the prohibition, which our decisions
have derived from [s]ection 141(a), against contractual arrangements that
commit the board of directors to a course of action that would preclude
them from fully discharging their fiduciary duties to the corporation and its
shareholders.” 69 If this were allowed, a breach of the board of directors’
fiduciary duty would ensue. 70
The Delaware Supreme Court’s decision of “split[ting] the baby” 71
enabled the SEC to finally give a conclusive answer to CA’s request for
exclusion. 72 On the same day the Delaware Supreme Court declared the
proposal invalid, Mr. Kim wrote to the parties involved and told them that
due to the Delaware Supreme Court’s decision, CA would be allowed to
exclude the proposal. 73 Consequently, CA’s no-action request was resolved.
However, debate on the case had just begun.
V. THE REACTION TO THE SEC’S CERTIFICATION
Not all scholars agree that the CA, Inc. case was handled correctly by
the SEC. For example, Professor J. Robert Brown, an expert on corporate
law and governance and a teacher at the Sturm College of Law at the
University of Denver has criticized the SEC’s decision to certify questions
of law that arise under Rule 14a-8 directly to the Delaware Supreme
Court. 74 However, Professor Brown’s criticism is incorrect. The SEC’s
decision to certify two questions to the Delaware Supreme Court was a
proper and necessary exercise of deference to state law under the federal
proxy rules. Although the SEC has the power to certify questions to the
Delaware Supreme Court, it did not have to. 75 The SEC could have refused
to exclude the proposal and allow the parties to litigate the case in state

67. Id. at 237.
68. The court explained that “[t]he certified questions [before it] request a determination of the

validity of [AFSCME’s proposal] in the abstract. Therefore, in response to the second question,
we must necessarily consider any possible circumstance under which a board of directors might be
required to act.” Id. at 238.
69. Id. at 240.
70. Id. at 238, 240.
71. CA v. AFSCME: The Delaware Supreme Court Giveth and the Supreme Court Taketh
Away, supra note 42.
72. CA, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2008 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 516, at *1.
73. Id. at *1–2.
74. As Predicted: The SEC and the Further Denial of Shareholder Access, supra note 27.
75. The SEC is not obligated to certify questions of law to the Delaware Supreme Court. The
SEC’s power is unilateral. See DEL. CONST. art. IV, § 11(8).
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court if they wanted to. 76 Instead, the SEC decided to certify in order to get
a proper interpretation of Delaware law, enabling the Staff to obtain
accurate answers to Rules 14a-8(i)(1) and (i)(2). 77
A. RESPONDING TO PROFESSOR BROWN
According to Professor Brown, the SEC’s decision to certify questions
of law to Delaware is nothing more than an “approach[] designed to renege”
on a promise to not exclude election-related proposals that have been
consistently allowed by the Staff. 78 Professor Brown argues that the SEC’s
decision to certify questions of law to Delaware in the CA, Inc. no-action
request was “unnecessary,” 79 ill advised as a “matter of policy,” 80 and a
“back door effort by the staff to restrict other types of proposals designed to
increase the ability of shareholders to elect directors.” 81
First, Professor Brown argues that the SEC should never certify
questions of law to the Delaware Supreme Court because it is
unnecessary. 82 According to Professor Brown, an “alternative mechanism
exists for testing the legality of [proposals]” 83—the Staff can deny the
company’s request for no-action relief and allow the company to litigate the
matter in Delaware if it wants to. 84 Since the SEC can decide a federal
issue, while at the same time the parties to the action can take proper
recourse via the state court system, “no reason” exists to use the
certification power granted by Delaware to the SEC. 85
Although Professor Brown is correct when he states that his “alternative
mechanism” is a method by which proposals can be presented to the state

76. This is exactly what Professor Brown says the SEC should have done. See As Predicted:
The SEC and the Further Denial of Shareholder Access, supra note 27.
77. See CA, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2008 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 495, at *1–2.
78. Responding to a “decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit that did not
defer to the [SEC’s] longstanding interpretation of [Rule 14a-8(i)(8)]”, Shareholder Proposals
Relating to the Election of Directors, Exchange Act Release No. 34-56914, 72 Fed. Reg. 70450
(Dec. 11, 2007), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2007/34-56914.pdf, the “SEC
adopted amendments to Rule 14a-8(i)(8) that included extremely broad language” that many
feared would be used to exclude proposals relating to a director election that prior thereto were
consistently allowed in. As Predicted: The SEC and the Further Denial of Shareholder Access,
supra note 27. However, the SEC assured the public that such proposals would continue to be
allowed. Professor Brown feels that while such proposals will be permitted under an (i)(8)
analysis, the certification power is just a backhanded way of getting the proposal excluded under
(i)(1) or (i)(2) by having the Delaware Supreme Court do it for them. Thus, according to Professor
Brown, the SEC is de facto excluding the proposal and “reneging on their promise.” As
Predicted: The SEC and the Further Denial of Shareholder Access, supra note 27.
79. As Predicted: The SEC and the Further Denial of Shareholder Access, supra note 27.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. As Predicted: The SEC and the Further Denial of Shareholder Access, supra note 27.
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courts, 86 if such mechanism was adopted when the SEC had the ability to
certify questions of law directly to the pertinent state court, Rules 14a8(i)(1) and (i)(2) would be effectively rendered meaningless. Proposals that
would unquestionably be excluded under Rule 14a-8 (with the aid of a state
court’s opinion) would be allowed in. Other requests, such as those that
touched upon an unsettled state law issue, would automatically be denied
no-action relief, since the company would be unable to carry the burden
necessary to exclude a proposal under the federal proxy rules. 87 By not
exercising its certification ability, the SEC would be wasting its ability to
get a definitive determination from the company’s state of incorporation.
More importantly, the SEC would not be interpreting Rule 14a-8 under
Professor Brown’s method in the best way possible because the SEC would
be denying companies and shareholders alike direct access to the relevant
state court, the Delaware Supreme Court—the court with the ability to bring
finality to an unsettled area of Delaware law. 88 Although Professor Brown’s
method is one way of resolving issues like the one presented in the CA, Inc.
no-action request, the SEC’s certification ability is better.
Professor Brown also asserts that the SEC’s decision to certify
questions of law to the Delaware Supreme Court is ill-advised as a matter of
policy. 89 According to Professor Brown, the “Commission should not be in
the position of having its interpretation decided by the pro-management
Delaware courts.” 90 Instead, Professor Brown asserts that the SEC, being
the federal agency in charge of interpreting Rule 14a-8 of the ‘34 Act,
should only rely on itself for deciding issues arising under Rule 14a-8. 91
Although it is true that Delaware effectively decided the Rule 14a8(i)(1) and (i)(2) questions in the CA, Inc. no-action request, 92 the purpose

4.

86. The SEC still uses this method in non-Delaware no-action requests. See Atkins, supra note

87. Professor Brown’s “alternative mechanism” is the proper method to use when the SEC
does not have the ability to certify questions of law to the company’s state of incorporation.
However, when the SEC has a process to get a correct state interpretation, that process should be
used. Whether other states should follow Delaware’s lead and grant the SEC the ability to certify
questions to its highest court is discussed infra Part V.B.
88. The SEC’s job is to determine how a state court would decide the no-action request
presented to them. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)(1) & (i)(2) (2008). Thus, if the SEC can get an
answer from the court with the ability to interpret such mandate, an argument can be made that the
SEC must attempt to receive an answer from that court.
89. As Predicted: The SEC and the Further Denial of Shareholder Access, supra note 27.
90. Id.
91. See generally id.
92. Technically, all Delaware decided was the proposal’s legality under state law. The SEC
then took that decision and applied it to Rules 14a-8(i)(1) and (i)(2). However, by deciding the
state law question, Delaware effectively dictated to the SEC how they should come out on the
Rule 14a-8(i)(1) and (i)(2) issue. Nevertheless, the focus should not be on whether the Delaware
Supreme Court’s opinion had the de facto effect of deciding the no-action request, but rather
whether the SEC’s interpretation of Rules 14a-8(i)(1) and (i)(2) violated principles of federalism.
It is the position of this Note that it did not, since, by its very nature, Rules 14a-8(i)(1) and (i)(2)
require deference to other law.
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of Rules 14a-8(i)(1) and (i)(2) is for the SEC to defer to state law. It is a
fact that “[i]nevitably, proxy regulation intrudes to a certain extent on state
regulation of shareholder voting rights.” 93 This is because “corporations are
creatures of state law and . . . state law remains [the main basis for
corporate governance rules].” 94 Thus, if the SEC decided the issue when an
alternative method existed by which the SEC could get a direct answer, it
would be overstepping the “authority that has been clearly delegated to it by
Congress.” 95
In addition, while the CA, Inc. case does raise questions of federalism,
it does not do so in the usual sense. In the classic federalism case, the
federal and state government battle over whose laws govern a particular
area of the law. 96 The two sides each believe that their rule is the governing
one. 97 Here, the exact opposite situation is present. Instead of the state
government and the federal government bickering with each other over
which law governs, the SEC and Delaware are working in tandem, as
Delaware is relying on the SEC to certify unsettled questions of law, while
the SEC is relying on Delaware to render an opinion so the SEC can decide
the no-action request presented to it. 98 Because the SEC had already
interpreted Rules 14a-8(i)(1) and (i)(2) in the CA, Inc. no-action request to
mean that further clarification was needed from the Delaware Supreme
Court to answer the no-action request presented to them, 99 the SEC’s
interpretation of Rules 14a-8(i)(1) and (i)(2) was not decided by the
Delaware courts. Asking members of the Staff, whose expertise lays outside
the realm of complex questions of state law, 100 to decide the issue for
themselves when a process exists whereby they can receive an answer from
state courts, would go against the mandate of Rules 14a-8(i)(1) and (i)(2).
Therefore, the SEC’s certification to Delaware was a correct action. In
93. ProfessorBainbridge.com, CA v. AFSCME: Should the SEC Have Raised the Question?,
http://www.professorbainbridge.com/ (July 13, 2008), (follow “Archive (Calendar) hyperlink;
then follow “Previous Year” hyperlink; then follow “July” hyperlink; then follow “CA v.
AFSCME: Should the SEC Have Raised the Question?” hyperlink) [hereinafter Bainbridge].
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. See Kala Ladenheim, History of U.S. Federalism, http://www.cas.sc.edu/poli/courses/
scgov/History_of_Federalism.htm (last visited on Mar. 1, 2009).
97. For an example of a “classic federalism” case, see South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203
(1987) (where South Dakota sued the federal government for imposing a national liquor age law
that was contrary to South Dakota’s liquor age law).
98. This observation is made by synthesizing the grant of certification power given to the SEC
by the Delaware Legislature, Del. Const. art. IV, § 11(8), the comments of Myron T. Steele, Chief
Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court (stating that the court wanted the SEC to “advance a more
direct interpretation of Delaware law”), Delaware Supreme Court to SEC: Bring It On, supra note
9, and the actual certification request by the SEC in the CA, Inc. no-action request. CA, Inc., SEC
No-Action Letter, 2008 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 495, at *1–2.
99. See 2008 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 495, at *2.
100. This is why a legal opinion from a law firm with knowledge of the governing state law is
required whenever a state law ground (i.e., 14a-8(i)(1) and (i)(2)) is asserted for a proposal’s
exclusion.
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contrast, it may be Professor Brown’s position that would cause a violation
of federalism principles to occur, as the SEC would be exercising authority
in an area of law generally reserved to the states, when an avenue exists by
which they could receive the necessary answer from the state. 101
The SEC’s decision to certify questions of law to Delaware in the CA,
Inc. case is also supported by Business Roundtable v. SEC. 102 In Business
Roundtable, the SEC adopted a rule barring self-regulatory organizations
(SROs) 103 “from listing the stock of a corporation that takes any corporate
action ‘with the effect of nullifying, restricting or disparately reducing the
per share voting rights of [existing common stock holders].’” 104 In an
opinion that one scholar refers to as “the most significant evaluation of the
scope of the SEC’s authority in [the § 14 area to date],” 105 the court
unanimously declared the law invalid because it “directly interfere[d] with
the substance of what . . . shareholders may enact.” 106 The court concluded
that the primary purposes of § 14 of the ‘34 Act are disclosure and
enhancement of communication with potential absentee voters.107
Therefore, if the regulation was allowed, the federalism principle of
corporations as “creatures of state law” 108 would have been “severely
impinged.” 109
The Business Roundtable decision is clear on the authority of the SEC
under § 14 of the ‘34 Act: the SEC will receive maximum deference when
it comes to promulgating and interpreting rules that will effect proxy
communication and disclosure, but will get minimum deference when other
areas are regulated, especially those that are “within the state’s purview.” 110
101. See As Predicted: The SEC and the Further Denial of Shareholder Access, supra note 27
(stating that the Commission should have the “staff . . . withdraw the request [and] [l]et the
proposal go forward . . . leav[ing] it to the parties to sort it out in the Delaware courts if they think
it appropriate.”).
102. See Business Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406 (D.C. Cir. 1990). This case was brought to
my attention by Professor Stephen Bainbridge’s blog posting. See Bainbridge, supra note 93.
Professor Bainbridge is a Professor of Law at the UCLA School of Law.
103. Self-regulatory organizations are defined as “non-governmental organization[s] that ha[ve]
the power to create and enforce industry regulations and standards. The priority is to protect
investors through the establishment of rules that promote ethics and equality. Some examples of
SRO’s include stock exchanges [e.g., the New York Stock Exchange], the Investment Dealers
Association of Canada, and the National Association of Securities Dealers in the United States.”
Investopedia, Self-Regulatory Organization, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/sro.asp (last
visited Mar. 1, 2009).
104. Business Roundtable, 905 F.2d at 407.
105. Bainbridge, supra note 93. It should also be noted that Rules such as 14a-8 are
promulgated according to their respective section in the ‘34 Act (i.e. § 14 of the ‘34 act is
enforced by various rules, such as Rule 14a-8 under the Exchange Act.) Accordingly, when § 14 is
referred to, it covers the same substantive area that Rule 14a-8 is covering as well.
106. Business Roundtable, 905 F.2d at 411.
107. See id. at 410.
108. Id. at 412 (citing Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 469 (1977)).
109. Business Roundtable, 905 F.2d at 412.
110. Bainbridge, supra note 93.
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Thus, it becomes evident that the SEC properly certified questions to the
Delaware Supreme Court in the CA, Inc. no-action request because
AFSCME’s proposal touched upon reimbursement of proxy solicitation
costs, a traditional state law issue. 111 Under Business Roundtable, if the
SEC can get an answer from a state court about an unsettled issue of state
law, it must attempt to defer to the proper state court, since answering the
issue on its own would be an exercise of authority not granted to it. 112
Professor Brown also argues that the SEC improperly certified
questions of law to the Delaware Supreme Court in the CA, Inc. no-action
request because, in doing so, the SEC was trying to “restrict . . . proposals
designed to increase the ability of shareholders to elect directors.” 113 He
asserts that when amendments to Rule 14a-8(i)(8) were made, the type of a
proposal like the one at issue in CA, Inc. was deemed to be allowed under
the proxy rules. 114 Thus, Professor Brown concludes that if the SEC was
honest about not excluding shareholder proposals relating to the election of
directors, it would not allow Delaware the ability to de facto exclude the
proposal. 115
Professor Brown’s sentiments about allowing shareholders increased
access to proxy ballots is a traditional state law issue because it concerns
the election of directors. 116 Thus, bylaw amendments that affect the election
of directors are best left to a state court’s interpretation, even if that state
court may have a bias towards management. 117 Furthermore, while
Professor Brown believes the SEC’s certification to Delaware is nothing
more than a “backhanded attempt” by it to exclude a shareholder proposal
concerning an election, 118 the SEC decided the issue under Rule 14a8(i)(2). 119 In fact, the SEC’s refusal to exclude the proposal under Rule 14a8(i)(8) in CA, Inc. was consistent with the SEC’s prior statements on the
subject. 120 The SEC is not in the business of deciding what should be the
111. See id.
112. A court may not have to accept the SEC’s attempt for deferral. See DEL. CONST. art. IV, §

11(8) (stating that the Delaware Supreme Court has the power to accept questions from the SEC,
but not that it must accept certification). If such a case were to occur, then Professor Brown’s
“alternative mechanism” would be acceptable.
113. As Predicted: The SEC and the Further Denial of Shareholder Access, supra note 27.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Of course, the SEC has authority to regulate voting procedure under § 14 of the ‘34 Act.
However, in my opinion, once the SEC gets into the realm of how the board is nominated or how
a person or slate of candidates can get onto a proxy ballot, then it is violating principles of
federalism. See Bainbridge, supra note 93.
117. Professor Brown believes that Delaware is a pro-management state. See As Predicted: The
SEC and the Further Denial of Shareholder Access, supra note 27.
118. Id.
119. CA, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2008 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 516, at *1–2.
120. 2008 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 495, at *1. Although it may seem that excluding a proposal that
was previously approved by the SEC is contradictory at first, it can easily be reconciled. As
previously mentioned, the SEC in prior statements only stated that they would not exclude
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best policy, or creating federal corporate law. 121 The only job of the SEC
under Rules 14a-8 (i)(1) and (i)(2) is to find out what the state law on the
subject is and to apply it accordingly. 122 Therefore, the SEC’s decision to
certify to questions of law in the CA, Inc. case was proper.
B. OTHER ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF THE SEC’S CERTIFICATION
POWER
The SEC’s certification ability gives other benefits to all parties
involved. One such benefit is economic. Under Professor Brown’s
“alternative mechanism,” a company would have to go through two
different court systems in Delaware: 123 the Chancery Court, 124 followed by
an appeal to the Delaware Supreme Court. 125 However, under the power
given to the SEC by the Delaware state legislature, litigants are directed
straight to the Delaware Supreme Court. 126 Thus, not only does the SEC’s
certification power give a definitive, binding answer to all involved, but it
also saves money for litigants by eliminating an additional round of court
costs and attorney fees. In the case of corporate litigants (such as CA and
AFSCME), every dollar saved by the parties is another dollar available for
the corporation and shareholders. While the savings may be trivial for big
corporate entities (again, like CA 127 and AFSCME 128), such savings might
prove significant if the litigants were a small start-up corporation and an
individual, flesh-and-blood shareholder who made the proposal.
proposals, like the one proposed by AFSCME, under Rule 14a-8(i)(8). However, the SEC never
stated what its answer would be under 14a-8(i)(1) and (i)(2) because such an answer is impossible
to formulate in the ever-changing world of a state’s corporate law jurisprudence. Thus, the SEC’s
decision is consistent.
121. See Business Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406, 412 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (stating that federal
corporate law violates an area traditionally governed by the states).
122. See id.
123. The number of courts that would have to be encountered under Professor Brown’s
alternative method would vary from state to state. In Delaware, this type of claim would start in
the Court of Chancery and then be appealed to the Delaware Supreme Court. Thus, the jurisdiction
of two courts would be invoked.
124. The Delaware Court of Chancery makes “determination[s] of disputes involving the
internal affairs of the thousands upon thousands of Delaware corporations and other business
entities through which a vast amount of the world’s commercial affairs is conducted.” Delaware
Court of Chancery Homepage, http://courts.delaware.gov/Courts/Court%20of%20Chancery/ (last
visited Mar. 1, 2009).
125. “In civil cases, the Delaware Supreme Court has jurisdiction to accept appeals from final
orders issued by the judges (not commissioners or masters) of the Court of Chancery.” Filing an
Appeal
in
the
Supreme
Court
of
the
State
of
Delaware,
http://courts.delaware.gov/How%20To/Appeals/?SupremeCitizensGuide.htm (last visited Mar. 1,
2009).
126. See DEL. CONST. art. IV, § 11(8).
127. CA, Inc. had a gross revenue of $4.277 Billion and a net profit of $500 Million in 2007.
CA, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 27 (May 23, 2008).
128. The AFSCME Employee Pension Fund has been described as being worth a trillion
dollars. Supreme Court Decides SEC-presented Delaware Bylaw Issue (July 17, 2008),
http://www.delawarelitigation.com/articles/delaware-supreme-court-updates/.
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Another advantage of the SEC’s power to certify is the ability of the
Delaware courts to address corporate law questions faster and more
efficiently. 129 Allowing the SEC to certify questions of law to the Delaware
Supreme Court gives the Delaware Supreme Court the ability to render an
opinion on a subject over which it otherwise would have to wait to acquire
jurisdiction. 130 The “expedited process” allows for clarification of the laws
and gives guidance to the lower Delaware courts, unifying their decisions.
This unification factor is especially important for Delaware, whose
corporate law jurisprudence is often relied upon by courts in different
jurisdictions. 131
Prior to being given the ability to certify questions of law to the
Delaware Supreme Court, the SEC often deferred to the company’s legal
opinion in no-action requests where the only opinion submitted was
provided by the company. 132 When the SEC not only “receive[d] a wellreasoned legal opinion from the company, but also receive[d] an equally
well-reasoned legal opinion from [a] shareholder reaching the opposite
conclusion” the SEC usually ruled that a proposal could not be excluded.133
This is because “Rule 14a-8(g) places the burden . . . of demonstrating that
exclusion is warranted” on the company. 134 As a result, the Staff did not
“previously . . . permit[] exclusion when there [were] dueling legal
opinions.” 135 Under this line of reasoning, it is fair to say that AFSCME’s
proposal would not have been excluded under the SEC’s “old” method of
Rule 14a-8 interpretation and decision making. 136 Thus, the benefit of the
certification power has already been demonstrated, as the SEC under the old
129. This observation is made simply from common knowledge. The Delaware Supreme Court
took sixteen days to decide CA, Inc., from certification by the SEC. If the parties had to go
through the entire Delaware court structure, from the Court of Chancery through the Delaware
Supreme Court, it would take longer than sixteen days.
130. Like other similar courts, the Delaware Supreme Court is not allowed to give unsolicited,
“advisory opinions.” See DEL. CONST. art. IV, § 11(8). Thus, the Delaware Supreme Court (or any
other court in Delaware) would have to wait for a party to bring an action in order to rule on it.
131. One reason so many courts decide to follow Delaware Corporate Law jurisprudence is due
to the internal affairs doctrine. See Faith Stevelman, Regulatory Competition, Venue and
Delaware’s Stake in Corporate Law, 34 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1 (2009). The internal affairs doctrine
states that a company’s choice state of incorporation “effectuates a choice of corporate law that is
binding on the corporation and its directors, officers and controlling shareholders. Because of the
internal affairs doctrine, even when Delaware corporations or their managers become defendants
in out-of-state corporate lawsuits, Delaware’s corporate law will govern.” Id. Consequently, since
most publicly traded corporations are housed in Delaware, Delaware’s jurisprudence is very
significant.
See
Delaware
Dept.
of
State:
Div.
of
Corp.,
http://www.corp.delaware.gov/aboutagency.shtml (last visited Mar. 1, 2009).
132. See Atkins, supra note 4.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. In fact, Delaware is currently the only State to allow the SEC to certify questions of law to
any of its courts. The “old” method would be the one used by the Staff to decide Rule 14a-8 noaction requests made by companies whose state of incorporation is not Delaware.
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method of analysis would have come to the wrong conclusion in the CA,
Inc. no-action request.
Finally, from a policy perspective, other states should give the SEC the
ability to certify questions of state law to their respective courts in order to
give a proper answer under the federal securities laws. Currently, the SEC
is charged with interpreting state law when making a decision under Rules
14a-8(i)(1) and (i)(2). However, with the exception of Delaware, no state
allows its courts to hear cases directly from the SEC. 137 Consequently,
when the SEC is confronted with a novel question of state law (such as with
the CA, Inc. no-action request) the SEC’s ability to provide the correct
answer is severely limited—it must interpret a state’s law even though it is
not an expert in that state’s law. 138 Such a decision is difficult for any type
of federal institution, whether it be a court or agency. 139 Thus, other states
should follow Delaware’s lead and allow the SEC to certify questions of
law that arise under federal securities law. 140 By doing so, clear, quick and
accurate guidance will be given not only to the SEC, but also to companies
and shareholders alike as to what is permissible under the law of their state
of incorporation. If a state is truly concerned with its corporate law, then
there is no reason for that state to allow the SEC to interpret its corporate
law.
VI. THE AFTERSHOCK OF CA, INC. V. AFSCME: THE STATUS
OF SHAREHOLDER-ADOPTED BYLAWS AFFECTING
CORPORATIONS UNDER DELAWARE LAW
Although the CA, Inc. case raises questions of federalism, it is also a
landmark case in Delaware corporate law jurisprudence. 141 Although the
decision has scholars and commentators debating what exactly the
Delaware Supreme Court decided, ultimately the decision will prove to be a
victory in name only for shareholders who propose an election-related
bylaw amendment; for all other bylaws, the CA, Inc. decision is a
significant defeat. 142
137. See Atkins, supra note 4 (stating that the power to certify questions of law to Delaware
was a “new method” of deciding Rule 14a-8 issues).
138. See id. (stating that part of the SEC’s job under Rule 14a-8 is to “resolve issue[s] of state
law”).
139. See Essex Universal Corp. v. Yates, 305 F.2d 572, 580 (2d Cir. 1962) (Friendly, J.,
concurring) (stating that the task of a federal court to apply state law is difficult when the
jurisprudence on the subject is undeveloped). In reality, a federal agency trying to do the same
thing is just as difficult.
140. A state should not necessarily accept certification from the SEC. If state courts are content
with having the SEC interpret its laws without more explicit guidance, that is their prerogative.
141. CA v. AFSCME: The Delaware Supreme Court Giveth and the Supreme Court Taketh
Away, supra note 42.
142. See id. (stating that the CA, Inc. case “is a very significant decision that will prompt much
practitioner commentary and scholarly discussion . . . with implications that will take time and
future decisions to work out”).
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A. THE COURT’S OPINION
In order to arrive at a decision, the court had to answer two
questions: 143 First, was “the AFSCME proposal 144 a proper subject for
action by shareholders as a matter of Delaware law,” 145 and second, “would
the AFSCME Proposal . . . cause CA to violate any Delaware law”? 146
Regarding the first question, the court stated that the board of directors and
shareholders each have the power to “adopt, amend or repeal bylaws.” 147
However, the court concluded that the shareholders’ power to adopt, amend
or repeal bylaws is separate from management’s and “not coextensive with
the board’s concurrent power and is limited by the board’s management
prerogatives under [s]ection 141(a).” 148 Consequently, the court declared
that if the proposal was legal it must be in “the scope or reach of
shareholders’ power to adopt, alter or repeal bylaws.” 149 In order to
determine shareholders’ power under DGCL section 109(b) versus
management’s power under section 141(a), the court had to decide “what is
the scope of shareholder action that [s]ection 109(b) permits yet does not
improperly intrude upon the directors’ power to manage corporation’s
business and affairs under [s]ection 141(a).” 150
Relying on precedent, 151 the Delaware Supreme Court declared that
“procedural bylaws do not improperly encroach upon the board’s
managerial authority under [s]ection 141(a).” 152 Since the proposal’s call
for mandatory reimbursement would “encourage the nomination of nonmanagement board candidates by promising reimbursement of . . . proxy
expenses if one or more candidates [were] elected” 153 and because “[t]he
unadorned right to cast a ballot in a contest for [corporate] office . . . is
meaningless without the right to participate in selecting the contestants,” 154
the proposal at issue had the “purpose of . . . promot[ing] the integrity of the
[director] electoral process by facilitating the nomination of director

143. CA, Inc. v. Am. Fed’n of State, County & Mun. Employees Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227,
231 (Del. 2008).
144. For purposes of this section, the words “Proposal” and “Bylaw” (when capitalized) are
used interchangeably to refer to AFSCME’s proposal.
145. CA, Inc., 953 A.2d at 231.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 232. The court stated that shareholders find their power from § 109(a), while
management finds its power from §141(a). See id. Furthermore, § 109(b) articulates the grant of
power given by §109(a). Consequently, the court’s analysis (and mine) will often refer to §
109(b). See id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 234.
151. See CA, Inc., 953 A.2d at 235 nn.15–16.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 237.
154. Id. (alteration in the original) (citing Harrah’s Entm’t v. JCC Holding Co., 802 A.2d 294,
311 (Del. Ch. 2002).
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candidates by stockholders or groups of stockholders.” 155 The court
concluded that the proposal’s “substantive-sounding mandate to expend
corporate funds, has both the intent and effect of regulating the process for
electing directors of CA.” 156 Thus, the Delaware Supreme Court determined
that the bylaw was a “proper subject for shareholder action,” answering the
first question certified to them in the affirmative. 157
Next, the court had to address whether the bylaw was “inconsistent with
law,” 158 specifically, “whether the proposed bylaw, if adopted, would cause
CA to violate any Delaware law to which it is subject.” 159 Looking at the
proposal abstractly to see if there was at least one hypothetical situation
where the proposal would cause the CA board of directors to violate their
fiduciary duties to the corporation, 160 and relying on two prior Delaware
Supreme Court decisions, 161 the court concluded the bylaw, if adopted,
would prevent the CA board of directors from “fully discharging their
fiduciary duties to the corporation and shareholders.” 162 Therefore, the court
concluded that proposal was illegal. 163
In Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., the first
case relied on, a no-shop provision 164 for a proposed merger was held to be
“invalid and unenforceable” because it was tantamount to having the board
of directors of the target company 165 contract away their fiduciary duties. 166
Similarly, in Quickturn Designs Sys., Inc. v. Shapiro, the second case relied
on, a “delayed redemption poison pill” 167 was held to be invalid because it
would “deprive a newly elected board of both its statutory authority to
manage the corporation under [section 141(a)] and its concomitant fiduciary
duty pursuant to that mandate.” 168 Thus, in each case the court invalidated
“binding contractual arrangements that the board of directors had

155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

Id.
Id. at 236 (emphasis added).
CA, Inc., 953 A.2d at 237.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 238.
The two cases the court relied upon are Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC
Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994), and Quickturn Designs Sys., Inc. v. Shapiro, 721 A.2d
1281 (Del. 1998). Both cases are discussed infra.
162. CA, Inc., 953 A.2d at 238.
163. Id. at 240.
164. A no-shop provision prevents a “target company . . . from communicating with competing
bidders in an effort to obtain the highest available value for shareholders.” Id. at 238.
165. A target company is the company being acquired in a merger. See id.
166. See id.
167. A delayed redemption poison pill prevents a “newly elected board of directors from
redeeming a poison pill” for a certain period of time in hopes of deterring a hostile bidder from
waging a proxy contest. Id. at 238–39.
168. CA, Inc., 953 A.2d at 238–39.
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voluntarily imposed upon themselves” because of the interference it would
impose on the board’s fiduciary duties. 169
Applying a QVC/Quickturn analysis, the court concluded the proposal,
as written, was illegal because although the bylaw allowed the CA board to
“determine what amount to reimburse,” it contained “no language or
provision that would reserve to CA’s directors their full power to exercise
their fiduciary duty to decide whether or not it would be appropriate, in a
specific case, to award reimbursement at all.” 170 Since Delaware law forbids
a “board from reimbursing costs incurred where a proxy contest is
motivated by personal or petty concerns, or to promote interests that do not
further, or are adverse to those of the corporation,” 171 CA would violate its
fiduciary duties if the bylaw was adopted. 172 Even if shareholders were the
ones making the binding resolution, and not the board of directors like in
QVC and Quickturn, it would be a “distinction without a difference” 173
since the Bylaw would prevent the board of directors from discharging their
fiduciary duties properly. 174 Consequently, the second question was
answered in the affirmative. 175
Scholars and commentators immediately took note of the CA, Inc.
decision, and started to debate what the case actually meant for the future of
Delaware corporate law. 176 Furthermore, although the court said the
election-related bylaw was permissible as an exercise of shareholders’
power under section 109, it was not attempting to draw a “bright line” rule
of when something promulgated under section 109 intrudes upon
management’s power in section 141. 177
B. COMMENTATORS AND SCHOLARS REACT
The CA, Inc. decision has divided commentators and scholars over what
it actually means. According to Lisa Fairfax, 178 while a bylaw that
contained a fiduciary out clause would “do away with any concern that the
implementation of the bylaw would violate Delaware law in the form of
compelling directors to act in a manner that violates their [fiduciary
duties],” 179 even if such bylaw were valid, directors could now challenge it
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.

Id. at 239.
Id. at 240.
Id. This is the hypothetical situation alluded to by the Delaware Supreme Court in CA, Inc.
See id. at 240.
Id. at 239.
CA, Inc., 953 A.2d at 239.
Id. at 240.
See sources cited supra note 42.
CA, Inc., 953 A.2d at 234 n.14.
Lisa Fairfax, Professor of Law, Univ. of Maryland Sch. of Law,
http://www.law.umaryland.edu/faculty/profiles/faculty.html?facultynum=044.
179. What’s
Next
for
Shareholder
Advocates?
(July
21,
2008),
http://www.theconglomerate.org/2008/07/page/4/.
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by “allowing directors to challenge payment of expenses for every
successful candidate.” 180 Since “the potential for protracted litigation over
such questions . . . makes reimbursement uncertain,” 181 it is possible that
[the] “bylaw’s purpose of facilitating more nominees [is undermined].” 182
Professor Brown echoes Ms. Fairfax’s views, adding that while there was
“no language in the bylaw [pertaining to a fiduciary out clause,] there didn’t
have to be [because] [u]nder Delaware law, a board confronted with the
possibility of an illegal payment could have undone the bylaw in its
entirety. In other words, the fiduciary out was in the statute.” 183
However, not all commentators look at the CA, Inc. opinion so bleakly.
J.W. Verret 184 argues that this decision is “a measured victory for
shareholder activist[s] . . . [because] [t]here is a good chance that a Board’s
decision to withhold reimbursement through claims that its fiduciary duty
requires it would be subject to heightened review . . . since the [c]ourt has
accepted that this bylaw is intimately connected with the election
process.” 185 Larry Ribstein 186 answers those who believe the CA, Inc.
decision is a severe blow to shareholder activism by asserting the court will
not “use its power to negate shareholder rights . . . . The [c]ourt made it
clear that it was not deciding the issue as a matter of policy . . . . Thus, the
[c]ourt was careful to present itself as a pragmatic forum that would hear
shareholders’ arguments on a case by case basis.” 187 Similarly, another
commentator argues that “the case [is] . . . a significant win . . . [because]
the [c]ourt held that the election process was a proper subject for
stockholder action. A bylaw mandating the inclusion of stockholder
nominees on the company’s proxy statement should fare much better under
a CA, Inc. analysis.” 188
Outside of election-related bylaws, commentators and scholars
generally feel that the CA, Inc. opinion leaves little room for shareholders to
affect a corporation via the bylaw amendment process because of the
180.
181.
182.
183.

Id.
Id.
Id.
As Predicted: The SEC and the Further Denial of Shareholder Access (The Actual Result)
(Part 19),
http://www.theracetothebottom.org/the-sec-governance/as-predicted-the-sec-and-thefurther-denial-of-shareholder-a-46064.html (July 18, 2008, 9:00 AM).
184. See J.W. Verret, Assistant Professor of Law, George Mason Univ. Sch. of Law,
http://www.law.gmu.edu/faculty/directory/verret_jw.
185. ProfessorBainbridge.com,
Commentary
on
CA
v
AFSCME,
http://www.professorbainbridge.com/ (July 18, 2008) (follow “Archive (Calendar) hyperlink; then
follow “Previous Year” hyperlink; then follow “July” hyperlink; then follow “Commentary on CA
v AFSCME” hyperlink). Furthermore, Professor Stephen Bainbridge agrees with this view. See id.
(stating that [such] views are “probably right”).
186. See Larry Ribstein, Professor of Law at the Univ. of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign,
http://www.law.uiuc.edu/faculty-admin/directory/LarryRibstein.
187. Ribstein, Delaware Responds, supra note 42.
188. CA v. AFSCME: The Delaware Supreme Court Giveth and the Supreme Court Taketh
Away, supra note 42.
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QVC/Quickturn analysis that the court used. Professor Brown asserts that,
due to the CA, Inc. opinion, “[b]ylaws requiring boards to undertake steps
to curb global warming, . . . or to withdraw poison pills . . . [will] be on
their face invalid [since they are not procedural] . . . . The [c]ourt used the
case to dramatically broaden the types of bylaws that now must be excluded
under Rule 14a-8.” 189 This viewpoint is also asserted by another
commentator who says, “[o]utside the election process, the case is generally
negative for stockholder-adopted bylaws. For example, the strong
QVC/Quickturn analysis should doom any substantive component to a pill
redemption bylaw, such as a requirement that directors not adopt or renew
any pill that could be in place longer than a year.” 190 However, some
commentators posit that the future implications of the CA, Inc. case are
unknown 191 because the “court deliberately leaves us with little clarity and
certainty as to how to discern whether a given bylaw is one that is processrelated [and thus valid] . . . or is one that by mandating the decision is
necessarily substantive and, therefore, would be invasive of the managerial
prerogatives of the board.” 192 Therefore, the views of the CA, Inc. opinion
amongst experts in the corporate law and governance field are divided at
best.
C. THE FUTURE IMPLICATIONS OF CA, INC. V. AFSCME
The effects of the CA, Inc. case can be analyzed as in two distinct
categories: bylaws that affect election-related processes, and bylaws that
affect the board of directors’ substantive decision making process.
Concerning the first category, the CA, Inc. case is a victory in name only.
While it is true that a bylaw similar to the one AFSCME proposed (that
contains a fiduciary-out clause) is now valid, the board of directors have the
power to object to corporate expenses. 193 The mandatory reimbursement
feature for a short slate of directors made this bylaw unique. However, a
189. As Predicted: The SEC and the Further Denial of Shareholder Access (The Actual Result)
(Part 18), supra note 183.
190. CA v. AFSCME: The Delaware Supreme Court Giveth and the Supreme Court Taketh
Away, supra note 42.
191. See Genkin & Gottfried, supra note 42 (stating that the court avoided “articulating with
‘doctrinaire exactitude’ a bright line that divides those bylaws that shareholders may unilaterally
adopt from those which they may not since they would encroach upon the board’s power and
authority to manage the business and affairs of the company”). See also CA v. AFSCME: The
Delaware Supreme Court Giveth and the Supreme Court Taketh Away, supra note 42 (stating that
in the “unforeseen consequences department, directors may find that the CA decision’s broad
extension of a fiduciary trump card causes more problems than it solves. Under the CA analysis,
mandatory bylaws may no longer be mandatory. They rather appear to be subject to the directors’
overarching fiduciary duties. Directors who take action in reliance on a mandatory bylaw
therefore can now be second-guessed on fiduciary duty grounds.”).
192. See Genkin & Gottfried, supra note 42.
193. See CA, Inc. v. Am. Fed’n of State, County & Mun. Employees Pension Plan, 953 A.2d
227, 240 (Del. 2008).
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fiduciary-out clause makes the mandatory reimbursement provision useless.
The fear of protracted litigation that Ms. Fairfax expresses is a very real
situation that is quite likely to occur. Fear that proxy expenses will not be
reimbursed will act as a deterrent towards those who have an inclination to
nominate their own short slate of directors.
Although the court’s broad interpretation of the AFSCME bylaw as a
process-oriented bylaw is a victory for shareholders, it will be a victory
with no consequences unless the Delaware courts (or legislature) either (i)
expressly excepts a short slate’s mandatory reimbursement of proxy
expenses from fiduciary duties or (ii) allow shareholders to be compensated
or significantly penalizes corporations for bringing fiduciary-out lawsuits
that do not win. Without such deterrents, corporations have little, if any
reason not to challenge a reimbursement of proxy expenses from corporate
funds in a short-slate proxy contest.
Outside of the election-related bylaw amendments, the CA, Inc.
decision is a significant defeat for shareholders who wish to impinge upon
power generally reserved to the board of directors, such as the right to
redeem poison pills or to determine where the board invests the
corporations’ money. By using the QVC/Quickturn analysis, the court
reaffirmed that only a corporations’ board of directors has the power to
decide how “specific substantive business decisions” are made. 194 On a
certain level, such a decision makes sense because the corporation is run by
professional managers (i.e. the board of directors). Consequently, why
should their determinations be questioned by passive investors
(shareholders)? 195
Although Professor Brown believes the Commission was wrong for
certifying the questions it did to the Delaware Supreme Court, he believes
“the Delaware Supreme Court[’s] . . . reasoning . . . will allow companies to
challenge even more proposals submitted under Rule 14a-8. [This] will,
ultimately, put pressure on the Commission to sidestep the anti-shareholder
nature of Delaware law and allow access to the company’s proxy
statement,” a result which is the goal of every shareholder activist. 196 While
such a proposition is intriguing, and if it came to fruition, would make the
CA, Inc. opinion “largely irrelevant,” 197 it is not the state of Delaware
194. Id. at 235.
195. See generally ProfessorBainbridge.com, CA v. AFSCME: The Limits of Shareholder

Power (July 17, 2008), (follow “Archive (Calendar) hyperlink; then follow “Previous Year”
hyperlink; then follow “July” hyperlink; then follow “CA v. AFSCME: The Limits of Shareholder
Power” hyperlink).
196. As Predicted: The SEC and the Further Denial of Shareholder Access (The Actual Result)
(Part 17),
http://www.theracetothebottom.org/the-sec-governance/as-predicted-the-sec-and-thefurther-denial-of-shareholder-a-48788.html (July 18, 2008, 06:15 AM).
197. As Predicted: The SEC and the Further Denial of Shareholder Access (The Actual Result)
(Part 21),
http://www.theracetothebottom.org/the-sec-governance/as-predicted-the-sec-and-thefurther-denial-of-shareholder-a-47850.html (July 18, 2008, 12:00 PM).
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corporate law as we know it today. Furthermore, while the Delaware
Supreme Court did not announce with “doctrinal exactitude” the scope of
section 109’s power versus section 141, such language should be viewed as
a defensive measure taken by the court to protect itself, rather than as
language to support optimistic shareholder activists. 198 Therefore, the
impact of shareholders to intrude upon the power of management, at least in
the near future, will be minimal at best.
VII. CONCLUSION
The CA, Inc. case raises interesting questions of federalism and the
limits of shareholder activism. Regarding the issue of federalism, the SEC
was correct to certify the questions to Delaware because corporate law is
not an issue for the federal government to decide. Corporate law is a state
issue, and thus, when a method exists for the federal government to decide
an issue about a certain aspect of corporate law with certainty, it must.
With respect to the substantive decision behind the CA, Inc. case, the
opinion can be seen as a victory in name only with respect to electionrelated bylaws and a complete defeat in all other areas. The Delaware
Supreme Court was clear that the ultimate authority to make decisions
remains with the board, and while the court did say that a proposal like
AFSCME’s would be valid if it contained a fiduciary-out clause, it is that
requirement that will probably scare away activists from trying to wage a
proxy war when a short slate of candidates is involved. As a result, the
Delaware Supreme Court’s CA, Inc. decision reaffirmed many people’s
view of it as a “director-centric” court. 199
Joseph Antignani *

198. This observation is made by looking at the rest of the CA, Inc. opinion, in which the court
uses pro-management cases to support its decision.
199. CA v. AFSCME: The Limits of Shareholder Power, supra note 195.
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